

The Body as Instrument: John Glenn and the Evolution of NASA's Astronaut Health Standards, 1959–1998

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Abstract:

John Glenn's two spaceflights highlight NASA's shift from improvisational astronaut medicine to a rigorous, evidence-based health standard. His 1962 Friendship 7 mission occurred when physicians "tested general robustness...rather than specific, known risks of microgravity," reflecting the absence of human orbital data. By 1998, Glenn's STS-95 flight was designed as a targeted experiment comparing spaceflight-induced physiological changes with natural aging—an idea he formed after noticing that microgravity effects "closely resembled the effects of ordinary human aging." His experience bookends the development of NASA-STD-3001, showing how astronaut data transformed medical screening from broad endurance tests into defined, outcome-based criteria that now guide crew health for future long-duration missions.

1. Introduction

When John Glenn climbed into the Friendship 7 capsule in February 1962, no one, including the physicians who had spent three years examining him, could say with full confidence what several hours in orbit would do to a human body. Thirty-six years later, when Glenn returned to space aboard the shuttle Discovery at age seventy-seven, medical science understood spaceflight physiology well enough to build an entire mission around measuring it in him specifically. Between those two flights lies the story of how NASA's approach to astronaut health transformed from a program of blunt physical-endurance screening into a codified, evidence-based discipline — a transformation now embodied in documents such as NASA-STD-3001, the agency's Spaceflight Human-System Standard.

Glenn is one of very few people whose own body spans both eras of that transformation. His autobiography, *John Glenn: A Memoir* (1999), gives a first-person account of both experiences and offers a rare window into how astronaut medicine matured over four decades, from tests with little scientific grounding to a systematic program built on accumulated spaceflight research. This paper uses Glenn's two flights as bookends to trace that evolution. It argues that his 1998 mission was not simply a sentimental return to space, but a deliberate scientific experiment made possible by health standards that had matured enormously since 1962 standards that, in a curious twist, Glenn's own observations helped shape.




Figure 1. Key milestones connecting Glenn's two flights to the formal issuance of NASA-STD-3001.

2. Selecting the Original Seven: Medicine Without a Map

Project Mercury's selection process began in early 1959, when NASA subjected more than eighty military test pilots to an unprecedented battery of medical, physical, and psychological examinations (Library of Congress, 2017). The testing, conducted at the Lovelace Clinic in Albuquerque and later at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, was less a scientific protocol than an attempt to screen out any conceivable weakness in candidates who would be sent somewhere no human being had ever survived. Glenn later recalled the sheer range of procedures: blood, urine, and stool samples; scraped throats; measurements of stomach contents; barium enemas; and full-body submersion to record body volume, alongside tests of vision, hearing, heart rate, blood pressure, brain waves, and muscular response to electric current (Krell, 2022). He described the lower-bowel examination as the most uncomfortable procedure he had ever experienced (Krell, 2022).

What is striking about this process, in retrospect, is how little of it was grounded in an understanding of spaceflight itself. NASA doctors in 1959 had no orbital human physiological data to work from; the closest analogues were high-altitude aviation medicine and centrifuge research. The Mercury exams therefore tested general robustness — cardiovascular strength, sensory acuity, psychological stability under isolation and stress — rather than specific, known risks of microgravity, because those risks were not yet known (Ohio State University Libraries, n.d.-a). Candidates endured isolation chambers, centrifuge runs, and psychological interviews designed to weed out anyone who might panic or break down, and the seven finalists were prized as much for resilience and adaptability as for any specific physiological trait (Library of Congress, 2017). In effect, 1959 medicine was selecting for survivors of the unknown rather than managing identifiable, quantified risks — the opposite of how NASA operates today.

3. Friendship 7: The First Data Point

Glenn's three-orbit flight aboard Friendship 7 in February 1962 lasted under five hours, but it functioned as one of the earliest genuine data points in human spaceflight physiology. Because so little

was known about how the body would behave outside Earth's gravity, even simple questions had not been answered before launch — including whether an astronaut could safely swallow food in weightlessness. Glenn tested this himself in orbit by eating applesauce from a tube, confirming that weightlessness did not interfere with swallowing (Abebooks, n.d.).

The flight also served as an early proof of concept for monitoring an astronaut's vital signs remotely and in real time, a practice that would become standard on every subsequent mission. But a single five-hour flight by one healthy 40-year-old test pilot could not, by itself, establish what long-duration spaceflight would do to the human body. It answered a narrow set of survival questions — could a person tolerate launch, orbit, and reentry — without yet revealing the slower physiological changes, such as bone and muscle loss, that longer missions would later expose. That deeper understanding would take decades, and several more generations of spacecraft, to accumulate.

4. From Improvisation to Standard

The years between Glenn's two flights transformed astronaut health management from an ad hoc, mission-by-mission practice into a formalized discipline. Gemini and Apollo missions extended flight durations and began to reveal cardiovascular deconditioning and other effects of sustained weightlessness. Skylab missions in the 1970s, some lasting nearly three months, provided the first substantial evidence of bone density loss, muscle atrophy, and fluid shifts associated with extended microgravity exposure. As the Space Shuttle program and, later, the International Space Station extended human presence in orbit still further, NASA needed a standardized reference rather than mission-specific medical protocols.

That need produced NASA-STD-3000, the Man-Systems Integration Standards, which was first adopted for the International Space Station program and written primarily around ISS infrastructure (NASA, 2023a). As new programs with needs distinct from the ISS emerged, NASA replaced it with a broader standard: NASA-STD-3001, the Spaceflight Human-System Standard, first issued in the 2000s and maintained since by the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) (NASA, 2023a). Unlike the improvised Mercury-era testing, NASA-STD-3001 is explicitly evidence-based, built from decades of accumulated flight data, and is organized into two volumes: Volume 1 addresses crew health and medical care requirements, while Volume 2 addresses human factors, habitability, and environmental health in spacecraft design (NASA, n.d.-a; NASA, n.d.-b). It is telling that a standard of this scope and specificity simply could not have existed in 1959 — it required exactly the kind of longitudinal human data that Glenn's generation of astronauts, flight by flight, was the first to generate.

5. A Senator, a Chart, and an Idea

Glenn left NASA after his 1962 flight, was elected to the U.S. Senate from Ohio in 1974, and served for twenty-four years, including time on the Special Committee on Aging (AmericaSpace, 2016). It was in that capacity, while preparing in early 1995 for a debate on NASA's budget, that Glenn reviewed a NASA-authored text titled *Space Physiology and Medicine*. A chart in the book listing the documented physical effects of spaceflight caught his attention: muscular changes, osteoporosis, disturbed sleep patterns, balance disorders, a weakened immune response, cardiovascular changes, loss of coordination, reduced drug and nutrient absorption, and altered blood distribution (AmericaSpace, 2017).

Glenn recognized that this list closely resembled the effects of ordinary human aging — the very subject his Senate committee dealt with regularly (AmericaSpace, 2016). He began to argue that sending an older astronaut into space could serve as a natural experiment, allowing scientists to compare spaceflight-induced deconditioning against age-related decline in the same body. Late in 1995, he approached NASA Administrator Dan Goldin with the idea (AmericaSpace, 2016). What began as a senator's observation about a chart in a technical volume would, within three years, become one of the most closely monitored human physiology experiments NASA had ever conducted — with Glenn himself as the subject.

6. STS-95: The Astronaut as Experiment

Goldin did not approve Glenn's request immediately. According to Glenn's own account, Goldin set two conditions: the mission had to be scientifically valuable, and Glenn had to pass every medical and physical examination required of active-duty astronauts decades younger than himself (AmericaSpace, 2013). Glenn underwent a comprehensive evaluation administered by John Eisold, the attending physician of Congress, at Bethesda Naval Hospital, including heart, liver, kidney, and pancreatic scans along with whole-body and head MRI scans; Eisold found nothing that would preclude Glenn from flying (AmericaSpace, 2023; AmericaSpace, 2013). Glenn later wrote that his wife and adult children were unhappy about the prospect of his returning to space at seventy-seven (AmericaSpace, 2013), underscoring that the mission carried genuine, unresolved medical risk rather than being a purely ceremonial gesture.

In January 1998, Glenn was formally named a payload specialist for STS-95, and that October he became the oldest human being ever to fly in space (AmericaSpace, 2013). The mission's scientific package was explicitly built around comparing his physiological responses to spaceflight with known markers of aging — bone density, immune function, sleep patterns, balance, and cardiovascular performance among them (AmericaSpace, 2017). This is precisely the kind of fitness-for-duty and outcome-based evaluation that NASA-STD-3001 Volume 1 formalizes today, which defines permissible exposure limits, fitness-for-duty criteria, and permissible outcome limits as a means of protecting crew health while enabling mission success (Everyspec, n.d.). In 1959, medical clearance meant passing a battery of tests with no defined pass/fail thresholds tied to spaceflight risk; by 1998, it meant clearing a data-driven, criterion-based fitness evaluation designed around specific, previously measured physiological outcomes.

7. NASA-STD-3001 Today: Codifying What Glenn Lived Through

The standard that now governs astronaut health did not exist in any recognizable form during either of Glenn's flights, but its structure reflects lessons that his generation of astronauts helped establish. NASA-STD-3001 Volume 1 sets requirements for levels of medical care, permissible exposure limits, and fitness-for-duty criteria across the pre-flight, in-flight, and post-flight phases of a mission (Everyspec, n.d.). Volume 2 addresses habitability and environmental health, covering the vehicle-design side of keeping crews safe and functional (NASA, n.d.-c).

NASA now organizes the risks these standards address into five categories, sometimes summarized with the acronym RIDGE: space radiation, isolation and confinement, distance from Earth, altered gravity

fields, and hostile or closed environments (NASA, n.d.-d). Of these, altered gravity fields is the hazard most directly connected to Glenn's story. Extended time in microgravity — and the abrupt readaptation to Earth's gravity afterward — affects the skeletal, muscular, and cardiovascular systems in ways that closely parallel natural aging (SciTechDaily, 2025), which is the exact overlap Glenn identified from a printed chart more than two decades before it was organized into a formal hazard framework. The other four hazards — radiation, isolation, distance, and hostile environments — mattered comparatively little on a roughly nine-day shuttle mission like STS-95, but they define the much larger health challenge NASA now faces in planning multi-year missions to Mars, where the same gravity-related deconditioning Glenn helped illuminate will compound with prolonged radiation exposure and isolation (NASA, n.d.-d).

The Five Hazards of Human Spaceflight (NASA Human Research Program)



Figure 2. The five hazards NASA-STD-3001 organizes crew health risk around; altered gravity fields connects most directly to Glenn's case.

8. Discussion: What One Man's Two Flights Reveal

Glenn's case illustrates two related shifts in how NASA approaches astronaut health. The first is a shift from reactive to predictive medicine. In 1959, physicians tested broadly because they could not test specifically; they had no prior human orbital data to guide them, so they screened for general toughness instead of known risks. By 1998, NASA could design a mission around specific, previously documented physiological effects and evaluate a candidate against defined medical thresholds — the difference between guessing at what might go wrong and monitoring what was already known to happen.

The second shift is less often discussed: astronaut experience itself helped generate the evidence base that later became formal policy. Glenn was not a physician, but his years of exposure to spaceflight research — combined with his personal history as a spaceflight subject — allowed him to recognize a pattern in a NASA chart that reframed how the agency thought about who should fly and why. Recent peer-reviewed research reinforces the connection he noticed: physiological changes caused by spaceflight closely resemble those that occur with natural aging, a similarity researchers now use to study aging processes through microgravity simulation (Chen et al., 2025). Glenn's 1998 flight was, in that sense, an early version of exactly this kind of research design, tested on a human being instead of in a laboratory simulation. As NASA and other agencies plan longer missions to the Moon and Mars, this feedback loop between lived astronaut experience and formal health standards is likely to continue, with each new mission both testing the limits of NASA-STD-3001 and supplying the data that will eventually revise it.

9. Conclusion

John Glenn's two spaceflights, separated by thirty-six years, offer an unusually direct way to observe how NASA's approach to astronaut health evolved from improvisation to science. In 1959, medical screening was built to filter out weakness in the face of total uncertainty. By 1998, it was built to measure specific, well-documented physiological outcomes against a codified standard — a standard, embodied today in NASA-STD-3001, that treats the astronaut's body not just as a passenger to be protected but as a source of data to be understood. Glenn's own memoir captures both ends of that transformation from the inside, and his instinct to connect spaceflight deconditioning with human aging turned out to anticipate a link that spaceflight medicine continues to study today. As human spaceflight extends toward Mars and beyond, the standards that now govern astronaut health will keep evolving in exactly the way Glenn's career suggests they should: through the accumulated, hard-won evidence of bodies that have actually been there.

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